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Abstract 
Adam Smith’s metaphor of an invisible hand represents the instincts of human nature that 
direct behavior. Moderated by self-control and guided by proper institutional incentives, actions 
grounded in instincts can be shown to generate a beneficial social order even if not intended.  
Smith’s concept, however, has been diluted and distorted over time through extension and 
misuse. Common misperceptions are that Smith unconditionally endorsed laissez faire markets, 
selfish individualism, and Pareto efficiency. The author draws upon recent literature to clarify 
Smith’s meaning and to discuss ways of improving its classroom presentation. The author argues 
that the invisible hand operates within a variety of institutional settings, and that a number of 
arrangements are compatible with economic progress. 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
“Does what [Adam Smith] said matter? It should. If what he meant by the 
invisible hand is misunderstood, then what it is mistakenly said to mean may be 
misunderstood also.” -- William Grampp (2000, 442) 
 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” represents the unseen instincts of human nature that motivate 
and direct behavior. Channeled through appropriate human institutions, the invisible hand 
can generate a spontaneous and beneficial social order. However, institutions are often 
destructive and work at cross purposes. Hence, to understand progress one must study both 
human nature and the path dependent history of human institutions. In popular culture, 
however, the metaphor of the invisible hand has become a catch-phrase for the magical 
workings of markets alone, or the price system, or even for the moral foundations of capitalism. 
It is evoked as a mantra by followers of laissez faire economics and used as a vehement curse 
by market detractors. Economists themselves disagree when it comes to the varying treatments The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    2 
of the concept (Persky 1989; Evensky 1993; Rothschild 1994; Grampp 2000; Khalil 2000a; and 
Vaughn 2002). Many teachers and textbook writers are likely perplexed. In this article I provide 
an overview of the debate surrounding the invisible hand and offer a consistent interpretation 
based on Smith’s two books (1981, 1982c). The literature on the invisible hand is voluminous, 
and this treatment covers only the highlights. A resource guide for instructors is contained in 
the Appendix.  
 
The metaphor of an invisible hand has been part of English literature at least since 
Shakespeare. Macbeth, for example, implores the dark night to cloak his impending crimes 
with “thy bloody and invisible hand” (Rothschild 1994, 319). Adam Smith (1723-1790), who 
began his career teaching rhetoric, was surely familiar with this phrase and had no qualms 
about borrowing from earlier writers (as he did in the famous pin factory example).2 Smith 
invoked the invisible hand three times, but never more than once in the same work. Smith’s 
first usage occurred in his “Essay on Astronomy” (likely written before 1758, but published 
only in 1795 after Smith’s death.) Here superstitious persons ascribe thunder and lightening to 
“the invisible hand of Jupiter” (1982a, 49, emphasis added).  
Smith’s second usage appeared in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, first published in 
1759. Wealthy landlords are said to delude themselves into over-producing food, resulting in 
leftovers for the poor. The consequence is that the rich are unwittingly “led by an invisible 
hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been 
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants….” (1982c, 184, 
emphasis added). The conclusion is that even vastly unequal distributions of resources would 
not prevent the poor from consuming something akin to a living wage.  
The third version of the invisible hand appeared in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations. In a 
section devoted to the political economy of trade, Smith attempted to show that under 
conditions of potentially equal profit, business people will prefer to use their capital in domestic 
trade rather than in foreign trade. This is because entrepreneurs lack familiarity with their 
overseas partners and may also face questionable legal systems. The unintended consequence The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    3 
of this is that the home country gains investment, which promotes the social interests of higher 
domestic output and employment. Some authors infer that these factors make the home 
country more secure in its national defense, yielding also a public good (Persky 1989; Grampp 
2000). Smith wrote: 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [a merchant] 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner 
as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which was no part of his intention (1981, 456, emphasis added).  
On the surface the three invisible hands appear unconnected. The first deals with superstition 
in early belief systems; the second describes a trickle-down theory of income distribution; and 
the third addresses the role of social capital in keeping investments domestically. To make 
sense of these seemingly unrelated points we turn to Smith’s time period and world view. 
 
2  The Enlightenment Worldview 
Adam Smith was a prominent figure in the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment thinkers operated within the shadow of Galileo and Newton who had 
established systems of thought about “the great phenomena of nature” (1981, 767). Before this, 
“fear and ignorance” engendered the view among primitive peoples that “invisible beings” 
controlled nature (1982a, 50)—causing storms, floods, and droughts. Modern science made 
sense of this world “by representing the invisible chains which bind together all these 
disjointed objects” and introduced “order into this chaos of jarring and discordant 
appearances….” (1982a, 45-46).  
While natural sciences explored the physical world, Enlightenment philosophers looked 
inward to uncover those invisible principles which could explain the progress of human society. 
To Smith, “The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles is 
what is properly called moral philosophy” (1981, 769). Today this subject encompasses The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    4 
psychology, philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, and law. Smith taught the 
moral philosophy sequence at Glasgow University, which consisted of natural theology, ethics, 
jurisprudence, and expediency (economics). Smith’s students mastered ethics and law before 
applying these concepts to the principles of commerce (Skinner 2002, 358).  
Like gravity and electricity of the physical world, Smith believed that invisible natural 
forces exert a powerful pull on human conduct. What are these principles of human nature? 
Smith’s thesis, developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is that instincts fall into three 
broad categories:  
1) Selfish passions center on one’s own welfare (self-preservation, satisfaction of bodily 
desires, and personal achievement). Smith notes: 
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his 
own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it 
is fit and right that it should be so (1982c, 82-83). 
 2)  Social passions (e.g., benevolence, affection, and generosity) desire the positive 
welfare of others. Smith felt many philosophers such as Hobbes had forgotten or undervalued 
these powerful and desirable passions. Smith called attention to this omission in the first 
sentence of the book:  
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it (1982c, 9). 
3) Unsocial passions (e.g., hatred and resentment) desire the negative welfare of others. 
Although theologians decry the unsocial passions, Smith noted that “Resentment seems to 
have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the safeguard of justice 
and the security of innocence” (1982c, 79). 
All three sets of passions are necessary for full human expression and success because 
the instincts serve the purpose of nature: “It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, 
was fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made” (1982c, 85). Except among young The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    5 
children or adults improperly socialized, humans do not respond to base instincts in a knee-
jerk fashion. The raw passions must “be brought down to a pitch much lower than that to 
which undisciplined nature would raise them” (1982c, 34). Hence, although it is natural to feel 
the passion of selfishness, it is not natural for an adult to act selfishly without reflection: a 
healthy self-interest implies the discipline of self-control and a regard for the rights of others.  
By what process, then, do humans reflect? Smith’s model of “fellow-feeling” posited that 
humans can empathize with the passions of others. This trait is not a faculty of rationality but 
of imagination. When our own passions are in alignment with the passions of others we 
experience pleasure; when they are not we experience pain. Smith was clear that “the pleasure 
and the pain are always felt so instantaneously” that our reaction to mutual sympathy is not a 
utilitarian reckoning of self-interest (1982c, 14). Because of fellow-feeling, humans have a 
strong desire for the social acceptance that comes from pleasing others. A child listens to, and 
eventually attunes to, the sentiments of parents and peers. A selfish child learns perspective 
and self-control, coming to see things from the viewpoint of an impartial spectator. Although 
we seek the approval of others, Smith’s important contribution was to insist that ultimately it 
is the approval of ourselves that we must obtain (1982c, 262). Hence, humans have the 
capacity for autonomous behaviors that defy social norms. This can explain the evolution of 
institutions (for example, the eventual abolition of slavery).  
Institutions such as family, church, school, and even government play a role in helping 
an individual acquire self-control so that impulses are moderated. These institutions need to 
channel man’s passions in ways that “establish an identity of interests between public and 
private spheres” (Rosenberg 1960, 567). A competitive marketplace is an important institution 
for improving the moral climate because of its incentive structure that ties personal diligence to 
personal reward (Smith 1981 Book III; Rosenberg 1960, 562). McCloskey noted that “Adam 
Smith knew that a capitalist society… could not flourish without the virtues” that lubricate the 
machinery of society and commerce; the growth of the market “promotes virtue, not vice” 
(1994, 181).  The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    6 
Smith did not put much stock in ethics being taught by philosophers, however. In 
addition to the marketplace, the fire of moral imagination was stoked by literature, poetry, 
opera, and visual arts (1982c, 143; Wight 2006). These awaken sympathy and arouse the 
impartial spectator. A primary function of morals is to promote justice, which is the “main 
pillar” without which social organization would “crumble into atoms” (1982c, 86). Whereas 
person and property must be defended by civil and criminal codes, Smith’s system of justice 
relies upon citizens who practice self-command. It is within this context that Smith supposed 
that property rights, competitive markets, and individual liberty created conditions 
advantageous for commutative justice.3  
One additional feature of Smith’s system bears mention—its egalitarian slant. 
Enlightenment thinkers rejected the elitist notion that either a hierarchical or hereditary 
authority was necessary to promote the political, economic, or moral order. All men are created 
equal and it is experience and opportunity, not difference in ability, that distinguished the king 
or philosopher from the average man. In fact, Smith’s moral sentiments put greater trust in the 
common man than in the rich and powerful.  
In short, Smith attempted to understand the instincts of human nature that attract, 
bind, or repulse humans in society. In modeling behavior Smith goes beyond identifying a raw 
natural urge. He understands behavior as the product of natural urges acted upon by moral 
conscience, human institutions, and inputs of capital (intellectual, emotional, and imaginative). 
The invisible chains driving human behavior are complex because our reactions to events have 
resonating context. This background sets the stage for the economics of the invisible hand. 
 
3 Smith’s  Economics 
 
Man does not simply act on instincts but creates institutions and moral laws to harness them. 
Where do the original instincts come from? According to modern evolutionary psychologists, 
“instincts” are the short-cut reasoning or preference circuits that address specific adaptive 
problems of natural selection (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 330). Interestingly, Charles Darwin 
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Writing a century before Darwin, Smith developed the theme that Nature is the ever-present 
taskmaster: 
Thus self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends 
which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind 
are endowed with a desire of those ends, and an aversion to the contrary; with a 
love of life, and a dread of dissolution; with a desire of the continuance and 
perpetuity of the species, and with an aversion to the thoughts of its intire 
extinction (1982c, 77). 
This passage explains the origin of the natural instincts in the “great ends” of nature. It 
suggests an invisible hand sympathetic to purposeful action in evolution (Khalil 2000b, 391). 
Nature commands that there be striving in all living things. But the inducement for striving is 
not reason, which is “slow and uncertain.” Rather, the compulsion to flourish is made a part of 
man’s instincts, without regard to the ultimate beneficial ends that might flow from them:  
But though we are in this manner endowed with a very strong desire of those 
ends, it has not been intrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our 
reason, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has 
directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. 
Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and 
the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and 
without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the 
great Director of nature intended to produce by them (1982c, 77-78). 
Man’s effort to better his position through the propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” 
(1981, 25) is an example of a passion that is not part of any rational, goal-oriented activity. It 
arises from man’s instinctive desire to be believed and to persuade (1982b, 493). Smith used 
the phrases “the call” of nature (1981, 100), “the power” of nature (1981, 364), “the passions” 
of nature (1982c, 25) and the “appetites” of nature (1982c, 165) to refer to the invisible 
instincts at work. Although the goals of Nature are survival and propagation, man 
unconsciously attends to these ends through intermediary objectives.  The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    8 
This brings us closer to understanding Smith’s meaning of the invisible hand. The 
phrase appeared in Moral Sentiments when Smith explained how people make moral judgments 
based on perceptions of utility. Smith began the chapter by reviewing David Hume’s thesis that 
humans ascribe beauty to things that are useful. The utility of an object “pleases the master by 
perpetually suggesting to him the pleasure or conveniency which it is fitted to promote” (1982c, 
179).  A spectator “enters by sympathy into the sentiments” of the owner of the object, and it is 
by way of this projected sympathy that the poor aspire to be rich: “When we visit the palaces of 
the great, we cannot help conceiving the satisfaction we should enjoy if we ourselves were the 
masters, and were possessed of so much artful and ingeniously contrived accommodation” 
(1982c, 179).  
Smith’s innovation over Hume was to hypothesize that humans are hard-wired to see 
beauty in the suitability or fitness of things—not for the reason that utility might come from it, 
but intrinsically for the perfection that such order implies (1982c, 180). Smith noted that “We 
naturally confound [the expected utility] in our imagination with the order, the regular and 
harmonious movement of the system….” (1982c, 183). Smith gave the example of a man who 
traded in his old watch for a more accurate one, even though he is still habitually late: “What 
interests him is not so much the attainment of this piece of knowledge [exact time], as the 
perfection of the machine which serves to attain it” (1982c, 180). Man comes to love the beauty 
of order and he aspires for the opulence that would allow him to purchase beautiful and well-
adapted machines. This happens despite the fact that greater order and opulence will not make 
humans any happier. The belief that they do is the great deception that keeps man striving:  
And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception 
which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this 
which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found 
cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and 
arts.… The earth by these labours of mankind has been obliged to redouble her 
natural fertility, and to maintain a greater multitude of inhabitants (1982c, 183-4, 
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It is within this paragraph, describing man’s instinctive striving for fitness and order, that 
Smith provided the example of the landlord who overplants his fields. “It is to no [utilitarian] 
purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields” wrote Smith (1982c, 
184). The landlord’s motivation reveals a love of order and perfection—so he can observe the 
fields serving their fitted purpose. The next paragraph emphasizes that Smith is telling this 
story to illustrate “The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard for the beauty 
of order….” (1982c, 185).  
Because the landlord’s belly cannot consume all of the harvest, leftovers go to the poor 
in exchange for their “baubles and trinkets” (1982c, 184). Thus landlords 
are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into 
equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the 
multiplication of the species” (1982c, 184-5, emphasis added). 
This is a story not so much about greed as it is a story about man’s deepest instincts to 
arrange and to organize in ways that unintentionally and unknowingly serve the ends of 
nature. This invisible hand passage should now be read alongside its companion in Wealth of 
Nations: 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command…. he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention (1981, 456, emphasis added). 
This passage is also about man’s natural striving for intermediate objectives (security and 
wealth) that advance nature’s goals of survival and procreation. As in Moral Sentiments, 
entrepreneurs seek order in their affairs by using their resources in ways perceived to be most The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    10 
fit. The instinct for fitness and order can be trusted because it produces results that ultimately 
(in the right institutional setting) are harmonious and beneficial to society.  
With this backdrop it is possible to put forth a tentative definition of the invisible hand 
from Smith’s two books:4  
The invisible hand is human instinct. In the two passages in which Smith uses 
the phrase explicitly, the invisible hand refers to human instincts to strive for 
order and opulence.  
Recall that Smith’s Enlightenment plan is to find those few “invisible chains” that explain 
society and its progress. Smith, as a member of the Royal Society, was well-versed in the 
advances of natural science (Schabas 2003). Many of his closest colleagues were researchers 
into processes of nature. Before Smith wrote about the invisible hand’s effect on men of 
commerce, he had written extensively about the call of nature. He had written that man’s 
reasoning is weak, but his instincts are strong. He had noted that men often acquire a greater 
love of intermediate objectives than of final ends. Smith’s economic readers would have been 
familiar with this line of thinking. Instincts operate invisibly as a force of nature. As discussed 
later, the invisible hand is not simply the instinct of self-interest operating alone. Nor is the 
invisible hand the market or competition or efficiency—although these institutions and 
concepts may work synergistically with it.  
Smith bestowed approbation on the invisible hand for producing outcomes thought 
favorable to society in the specific instances mentioned. But whether the invisible hand works 
well or poorly depends on historical circumstances and path dependency. Nozick (1994, 314) 
observed that “Not every pattern that arises by an invisible-hand process is desirable….” One 
brief example illustrates this point. Because all humans are reasonably similar, the invisible 
hand that directs the landlord is the same invisible hand directing the entrepreneur, and it is 
the same principle directing politicians! The ruler’s innate instinct for order creates calamity in 
the wrong institutional setting—such as when a dictator gains control. In a prescient passage 
Smith anticipated the excesses of Utopian socialist engineers like Stalin and Mao who, like the The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    11 
landlord, came to value the order of their ideal plans more than any expected utility derived 
from them:  
The man of system … is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his 
own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from 
any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without 
any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may 
oppose it…. [But] in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece 
has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the 
legislature might chuse to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and 
act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and 
harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite 
or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times 
in the highest degree of disorder (1982c, 233-4). 
This underscores the point that for the invisible hand to work well there must be “incentive 
compatibility” between man’s natural passions and man’s institutions (Makowski and Ostroy 
2004, 6). Human history is littered with failed attempts. We turn to Smith’s account of this 
checkered human progress. 
 
4  The History of Progress 
Smith began Book III of Wealth of Nations with a chapter, “On the Natural Progress of 
Opulence.” Smith stated that “the order of things” is promoted by the “natural inclinations of 
man”—which is another way of saying that order is promoted by human instincts. Progress is a 
natural feature of human history, with an expected progression from hunting and gathering to 
pasturing to agriculture to industry, and eventually to foreign trade. Much of Book III dealt 
with how societies failed to achieve their potential because “human institutions … thwarted 
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Smith gave numerous examples of bad institutions, such as the customs of 
primogeniture and engrossing, which amassed land in the hands of those with little incentive 
to produce. Tenured professors receiving a salary, regardless of productivity, were another of 
Smith’s rants. Although man can be ambitious, so can he be lazy. It is the job of institutions to 
create the appropriate psychic tension by structuring incentives to encourage productivity 
(Rosenberg 1960). Smith said poor incentives push society into an “unnatural and retrograde 
order” (1981, 380). Smith’s development model is institutionally path dependent, an idea 
supported by North’s more recent conclusions (1993).  
Depending upon the impediments to progress imposed by customs, despots, 
monopolists, or misguided do-gooders, stagnation or decay can last for centuries. What are the 
circumstances in which the striving for order and opulence can best succeed? The public 
institutions required are a dependable and fair system of justice, a workable representative 
legislature, and reasonable regulations of commerce. The private institutions required are 
competitive markets and individual moral norms. The latter include honesty, integrity, a work 
ethic, and civic spirit. In several places Smith calls upon a private-public partnership to 
enhance civic education and to improve the moral climate.5  
Smith does not rely on morals and socialization alone, however, to generate a good 
society. Institutions are needed to harmonize private passions with the public interest. 
Financial market regulations provide an interesting example. Smith noted that the natural flow 
of capital will largely be toward investments creating the greatest individual opulence, which 
when summed over the nation produce the greatest national opulence. Private and public 
interests thus converge. But Smith carved out a large exception. Some lenders can make more 
money offering loans to profligates and speculators whose activities contribute more to 
consumption than to growth. Smith favored an interest rate ceiling of 5 percent to weed out 
borrowers whose private aims were not in keeping with society’s objectives (1981, 356-7). In a 
related discussion in which the invisible hand appears, Smith considered the problem of 
capital flight. He theorized that security concerns would lead merchants to congregate their 
funds domestically, hence no regulations on capital exports were needed to harmonize private The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    13 
with public interests (1981, 455). The two preceding points should make clear that Smith was 
not promoting market efficiency in a Pareto sense, but rather dynamic growth in the home 
country.  
Prosperity comes when individuals follow their instincts for creating order and 
accumulation within an institutional structure that channels those interests in ways beneficial 
to society. This does not require institutional perfection. In criticizing the physiocrats’ 
insistence on laissez faire, Smith noted that “If a nation could not prosper without the 
enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could 
ever have prospered” (1981, 674). Development happens from the bottom up and “the natural 
effort which every man is continually making to better his own condition is a principle of 
preservation capable of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a 
political oeconomy” (1981, 674).  
Smith’s historical approach reminds us that the beneficial spin given to the invisible 
hand is premised on specific institutional, social, and ethical constructs (Persky 1989; Grampp 
2000; Evensky 2001; Meeropol 2004). That is, the incentives that give rise to the trust, 
character, and legal system are idiosyncratic to the confluence of events, institutions, and 
individuals populating Smith’s time and place.6
 
5   Additional Dimensions 
Unintended Consequences, Spontaneous Order, and Providence 
One conclusion to be drawn is that decentralized human action can produce beneficial 
social outcomes even if these consequences are unforeseen and unintended. In Smith’s 
two examples, the invisible hand leads to what Hayek called “spontaneous order” 
(Vaughn 2002). But as noted previously, there is no guarantee that the invisible hand 
will produce order or progress without supportive institutions, and nonsupportive 
institutions do not spontaneously correct themselves. To many writers Smith’s invisible 
hand thus entails more than just an observation about unintended consequences; it is The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    14 
also a deeper narrative about the hidden order and reason behind unfolding events. 
Although man is blind to it, he is part of a greater plan, presumably conceived by a 
benevolent deity (Evensky 1993, 2001). An invisible hand without a sustaining 
benevolent force behind it “may well fail,” according to one reviewer of this article.  
Viner traced the history of the benevolent force idea in The Role of Providence in the 
Social Order (1972). Differing versions of this thesis circulated during the Enlightenment period 
and Smith was certainly aware of the debate. Most scholars, however, do not think Smith held 
orthodox Christian views despite his Presbyterian upbringing and his having studied for the 
ministry (Ross 1995, 406). Smith’s account placed the origins of man’s desires in nature. This 
can be further pursued by asking: What lies behind nature? Here Smith, as with other Deists 
or Theists of his day, was fully prepared to say a benevolent deity. This is the final cause of all 
things, whereas nature is merely the secondary cause. God is the clockmaker, whose springs 
are nature’s instincts, directing men’s actions without knowing their ultimate purpose. This is 
one of the most familiar metaphors used by Smith and other writers of his day (Macfie 1967; 
Viner 1972; Evensky 1993; Young 1997).7  
According to Khalil, however, Smith understood God not as an individual but as 
shorthand for “the purposeful nature which constitutes the living organism” (2000b, 375). 
Khalil rejected the interpretation that Smith accepted the God-as-intelligent-design view in 
favor of the Lamarckian concept of “evolutionary optimization” (2000b, 374). Whether Smith’s 
references to God as creator were genuinely felt (as Viner thought), or rhetorically used in self-
defense against religious critics, or even declared in jest or irony (Rothschild 2001, 116), the 
religiously circumspect Smith salted his moral writings with references to God as the “Author 
of Nature” whose final judgment would come.8 These references do not appear in his economic 
writings.  
Selfishness 
In the 20th century the invisible hand became a grabbing hand—the foundation for 
ethical egoism. Moral sentiments operate with different intensities in different realms of life. 
Distance tends to weaken sympathy so that the more impersonal a market is the more devoid it The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    15 
will be of moral sentiments. Smith thus noted that “it is in vain” to expect the help of all others 
based on “benevolence only,” but says we must find ways to address their “self-love” (1981, 26-
27). One could surmise that in the commercial sphere only selfish individualism reigns (a view 
promulgated in popular cultural by movies such as Wall Street). It is also a belief endorsed by 
many economists. Arrow and Hahn in General Competitive Analysis (1971), for example, 
assumed that the instinct for “self-interest” was identical to “greed” (Evensky 1993, 203).  
The entrepreneur in Wealth of Nations who seeks the highest return on his capital fits 
this account. The gluttony of the landlord in Moral Sentiments is likewise noted. No one could 
argue that Smith was Utopian about human nature or underestimated the greediness of 
individuals. But there are several dimensions along which the egoistic account of the invisible 
hand falls short. First, Smith said that the human instinct for order is not calculated self-
interest. Smith’s psychological system was founded upon sympathy, and anticipating that 
others might try to twist this into a theory of self-love, Smith stated explicitly, “Sympathy, 
however, cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle” (1982c, 317).  
A second problem with the greed interpretation is that the ends of nature (survival and 
procreation) require for their fulfillment a high degree of social cooperation and justice. The 
successful development of these institutions relies upon human virtues that Smith says arise 
from the nonself-interested passions, namely, the social passions and the unsocial passions. 
Selfishness is not a sufficient instinct for creating and maintaining a good society. Recent 
findings in economic psychology bear out the importance of placing self-interest within the 
context of other human instincts (Thaler 2000; V. Smith 2004).  
Third, although many markets are assumed to rely on anonymous exchange, Smith’s 
market examples usually depend upon conversation, civility, and character. Even the wholesale 
merchant most likely to deal in impersonal distant markets is alert to moral undercurrents. In 
fact, the merchant’s concern for social capital is clearly stated: “He can know better the 
character and situation of the persons whom he trusts…” (1981, 454). A person of high 
character is honest not because the law forbids theft, nor is he honest because he has 
calculated the advantage of appearing trustworthy. A person of character loves virtue itself The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    16 
(1982c, 22 and 224-5). Transactions costs are lower when a merchant believes his supplier is 
honest by principle not by calculation. 
A fourth problem with the greed interpretation is that Smith clearly condemned it. He 
pointed out numerous ways in which selfish individuals can produce bad outcomes for society. 
The instinct for promoting one’s own welfare is intense yet it is a passion that must be 
disciplined alongside other appetites. Smith explicitly said that the moral faculties 
“superintend” all the other passions and judge “how far each of them was either to be indulged 
or restrained” (1982c, 165). To accept the greed view one must believe that Smith’s two books 
are completely contradictory, a notion has been thoroughly discredited (Raphael and Macfie 
1982, 20-25).9  
 
Enlightened Self-Interest 
These points lead other authors to an invisible hand of “enlightened” self-interest. One 
can be honest and just in ways that promote institutions of cooperation and justice—with an 
eye toward the returns that these produce in the long run. Although it is possible to shoehorn 
Smith’s concepts into this framework, much is lost in translation (Sen 1987; Khalil 1990). 
Smith himself pointed out the subtle but critical difference between self-control achieved as 
part of a calculated mode of thinking and one achieved through instinctual sympathy. The 
calculated approach produces propriety of a “much inferior order” and the predicted behavior is 
substantially different (1982c, 263).  
According to Sen, moral commitment “drives a wedge between personal choice and 
personal welfare” (1977, 329). Buchanan likewise asserted that ethical constraints on 
individual behavior are beyond rational calculation (1994, 63). Nor would Smith subsume all 
interest in others under the rubric of enlightened self-interest. First, the demands on 
rationality for this to work exceed a human’s limited capabilities. Second, calculating one’s 
interest takes time but moral sentiments are felt instantaneously. Smith applauded the view 
that people can learn to act with enlightened self-interest (indeed, this is one of the moral The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    17 
justifications for markets), but he explicitly rejected the view that sympathy arises from 
enlightened self-interest (1982c, 13-14).  
 
Efficiency 
Today the invisible hand is most commonly said to mean the process by which 
competitive markets achieve efficiency through the price allocation mechanism (Persky 1989; 
Meeropol 2004, 12, fn 14). This is the interpretation given in Standard 9 of the Voluntary 
Economic Content Standards for America’s Schools, developed by a group of distinguished 
educators (Siegfried and Meszaros 1998, 146). This explanation is appealing and fits with 
much of Smith’s thinking. Critics, however, have observed that Smith’s writings on the 
invisible hand do not correspond very well with neoclassical treatments of competition, prices, 
or distribution (Grampp 2000; Khalil 2000a). Efficiency is not a necessary consequence of the 
invisible hand nor is it wholly consistent with Smith’s goals. 
A key point against the efficiency interpretation is that Smith’s focus was avowedly 
nationalistic. His objective was the greatest output and employment growth for Britain. 
Because capital is a limiting factor, funds employed overseas reduce Britain’s dynamic 
potential. The invisible hand in Wealth of Nations operates with the incentives of a particular 
institutional setting so as to keep capital within Britain’s borders. It is paradoxical that the 
efficiency interpretation for the invisible hand persists when Smith said that asymmetric 
information and high transactions costs are what limited global capital flows. Khalil observed 
with irony that Smith’s invisible hand highlights how “national welfare advances when markets 
fail” (2000, 374).  
Finally, Smith supported regulatory institutions that were vital for achieving his growth 
objective yet clearly obstructed consumer sovereignty and the market equilibrium (e.g., 
financial regulations that kept capital out of the wrong hands). In this, as in some other 
examples, Smith is not endorsing the Pareto-efficient model. To suggest that competitive 
market equilibria would produce the results that Smith intends omits too much of his broader 
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Laissez Faire 
Smith was passionate in denouncing government intervention but his tirades were 
mainly directed against those who would seek home country monopolies and then restrict 
imports to bolster these investments. Many writers have pointed out that Smith was not averse 
to government investments or controls in some sectors of the economy for other motives. Smith 
explicitly debunked Quesnay’s system of perfect liberty as theoretically and practically 
unappealing (1981, 673-4). To insist on an ideal system of political economy was akin to a 
doctor prescribing one exact diet of food to be followed by every patient. The human body, 
Smith said, maintains “the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of different 
regimens” (1981, 674). Smith’s support of markets was pragmatic and he endorsed a range of 
interventions when he believed they would advance his objectives (Viner 1927, 153-54; Pack 
1991; Grampp 2000, 460).10  
 
There are many alternative approaches to analyzing Smith’s invisible hand: what it is, 
where it comes from, what it does, and its ramifications and complications (Samuels 2004, 5). 
These interpretations offer rich avenues for understanding economic and social processes. 
Many conflicting views likely endure because of Smith’s expansive rhetoric, which was prone to 
inconsistency and exaggeration. Samuels thus lamented “I wish that Smith had had an editor” 
(2004, 20). 
 
6 Conclusion 
Smith’s insights resonate today across a broad spectrum of topics and disciplines (Wight 
2002a). His ideas percolate in the works of a number of Nobel prize winners, suggesting that 
economics students may have something to learn from the history of thought. In this light, 
Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand “is arguably the most important concept in modern 
social thought” (Khalil 2000b, 373). Smith had no illusion that human models could explain 
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“wheels” and “springs” behind human society. He was quite willing to point out ways in which 
the unfolding of human society produced disaster, and he gave two famous examples of the 
invisible hand in which things worked for the better.  
The interpretation of Smith’s invisible hand offered here is that it represents man’s 
natural instincts channeled by institutions and self-command. A person’s highest instincts are 
to persuade, to be believed, to sympathize, to fashion order, to truck and barter, and to better 
one’s conditions in the surroundings. These are invisible passions that lead persons, both in 
Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nation. Although self-interest is a dominant and necessary 
passion in the economic realm, it does not operate in isolation. Experiments show that even 
graduate students in economics have not lost an instinctual passion for reciprocity and justice 
(V. Smith 2004).  
There are important lessons for economic students. If human instincts are allowed to 
operate within incentive-compatible environments they are capable of producing not only 
private benefits but, in many cases, social benefits that are not intended. Hence one does not 
need to start from a virtuous motive such as benevolence to produce something of value for 
society. In a supportive institutional structure, decentralized action can generate a 
spontaneous order that yields dynamic growth with liberty. No one ideal system of political 
economy exists to accomplish this and Smith noted that many variations will work tolerably 
well. This understanding reasonably fits the facts of the modern world: rich industrial 
democracies exhibit a diversity of institutions and a range of mixed market systems. Smith, a 
pragmatist rather than an ideologue, was optimistic that the invisible hand instincts could 
naturally lead to progress over time. 
Smith’s broader moral and psychological perspectives bear mentioning. Teachers 
should at minimum note that the invisible hand does not constitute an endorsement of selfish 
individualism. Smith’s view of progress requires that private and public institutions promote 
moral development, without which markets and society fail to achieve their potential. Vernon 
Smith, in support of Smith’s view, says he “cannot overemphasize” that “we are all a collage of 
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consciously, and of whose work in enabling social stability we are unaware—in turn depend 
upon context” (2004, 72). Individuals and institutions form the tapestry of society. The system 
of natural liberty espoused by Smith is “his constant effort to bind together the theological, 
jurisprudential, ethical, and economic arguments into one comprehensive, interrelated system 
of thought—his interpretation of the ‘great system of nature’” (Macfie 1971, 599).  
Economics instructors are encouraged to refresh their insights with some of the modern 
scholarship on Smith. Smith debunked the "greed is good" philosophy, ridiculed the notion 
that wealth alone could provide happiness, and built an elaborate psychological foundation for 
behavior that goes well beyond egoism. Students getting a one-dimensional account of the 
invisible hand—in which self-interest is elevated to greed—miss important behavioral issues 
that are being rediscovered in experimental labs today. My own experience in teaching about 
Adam Smith is that students appreciate receiving a fuller view of human nature and the 
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Appendix: Resources for Instructors 
Books by Adam Smith 
Glasgow University produced a definitive collection of The Works and Correspondence of Adam 
Smith. These volumes contain extensive cross-referencing, expanded indexing, and 
introductory essays encapsulating significant scholarship. The Glasgow Editions were reprinted 
by the Liberty Fund in paperback format.  These volumes are also available for free in 
electronic form (see Online Resources). The Liberty Fund titles are: 
Vol. 1: The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 1982c [1757]. This book went through six 
editions in Smith’s lifetime, the last completed shortly before his death in 1790. 
Vols. 2 and 3: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1981 
[1776]. This work went through four editions during Smith’s lifetime, the last 
appearing in 1786. 
Vol. 4: Essays on Philosophical Subjects. 1982a [1795]. Published posthumously a few 
years after Smith’s death, this volume contains a number of Smith’s important 
essays, including “The History of Astronomy” and “Of the Imitative Arts.” It also 
contains the only contemporaneous biography by Smith’s friend, Dugald 
Stewart.  
Vol. 5: Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 1985. Smith began his career teaching 
rhetoric. These are a student’s notes of Smith’s course at the University of 
Glasgow, 1762-3.  
Vol. 6: Lectures on Jurisprudence. 1982b. This contains two sets of student notes of 
lectures Smith gave at the University of Glasgow, 1762-3 and 1766. They 
analyze the rise and forms of government, laws and regulations. A book on this 
subject was to have formed Smith’s planned trilogy uniting morals, justice, and 
markets. Smith died before its completion. The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    22 
Vol. 7: The Correspondence of Adam Smith. 1987. In addition to letters, this volume 
contains important documents linked to Smith, such as his analysis of the war 
in the American colonies.  
A modern biography incorporating the new scholarship was written by Ross (1995) as 
part of the Glasgow project, The Life of Adam Smith. 
Instructional Materials  
Many sources cited in this paper could be used in upper-level undergraduate courses. 
The introductory essays to the Glasgow editions of Wealth of Nations and Moral Sentiments are 
useful in summarizing the substance of Smith’s major works and placing them in context of 
each other and his time. Tribe (1999) provides a critical assessment of Smith’s work. Skinner 
(2002) sketches a rich overview of Smith. An appraisal of Smith’s morals and his economic 
system can be found in Evensky (2001). Fleischacker’s (2004) recent contribution, On Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion provides interesting essays for advanced 
undergraduates. Excerpts of Smith’s writings are available in Otteson (2004), Adam Smith: 
Selected Philosophical Writings and Heilbroner (1986), The Essential Adam Smith. 
Faculty who wish to introduce Smith’s ideas to principles students have several good 
options. For a short introduction to Smith’s life and times, consider the classic chapter from 
Heilbroner’s (1999), The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great 
Economic Thinkers. For a longer view of this theme, see Muller (1995), Adam Smith: In His Time 
and Ours. Fiction can provide an effective vehicle for the transmission of economic ideas, and 
this journal has devoted space for articles discussing alternative pedagogies (Watts 2002). In 
Saving Adam Smith (2002), Wight constructs an “academic” novel to bring Adam Smith back to 
life, using Smith’s own words for much of the dialogue. Morals and markets are discussed, 
with endnotes and a literature review.  
Online Resources 
The Liberty Fund maintains an electronic library of Smith’s works, making it easy to 
search for words or to download complete books. To access the Glasgow editions texts go to 
www.libertyfund.org.  Select “The On-Line Library of Liberty” and search for books by Adam The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    23 
Smith. The History of Economic Thought Website maintained at the New School contains a 
collection of essays and articles (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/index.htm). Finally, the Adam 
Smith Society, founded in 1995, encourages interdisciplinary scholarship on Smith and 
provides forums for sharing findings (www.adamsmithsociety.org). 
 
Notes 
                                                   
1 The author acknowledges valuable suggestions from Andrea Maneschi, Elias Khalil, 
David Brat, Rob Dolan, two anonymous referees, and the editor. 
2 The pin factory illustrating the division of labor appeared in Voltaire’s Candide (1759) 
and still earlier in an article by Delaire (1755) in Diderot’s Encyclopédie. 
3 Although distributive justice is an important concern (Young 1997), Smith’s main 
interest was commutative justice (fair rules). Paradoxically, however, the invisible hand of Moral 
Sentiments resulted in a redistribution of income that Smith implied was desirable.  
4 The “invisible hand of Jupiter” does not fit this pattern, although Macfie (1971, 596) 
noted that there is no inconsistency. Primitive peoples attempted to make order out of their 
experiences by ascribing events to invisible gods. Smith attempted to make order out of human 
experience by ascribing events to invisible instincts.  
5 Civic virtues are to be encouraged for many reasons including national defense. 
Publicly-supported education would help overcome the numbing effects of the division of labor, 
and would more generally succeed in uplifting society by reinforcing people’s notions of duty 
and character (1981, 781-85). Smith also called on civil magistrates not only to preserve the 
peace but to promote prosperity by discouraging vice and promoting virtuous conduct “to a 
certain degree” (1982c, 81).  The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    24 
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 For example, the preference for home country investments is not a necessary feature of 
all economies. Recent experience suggests that capital flight can occur even when countries have 
reasonably efficient market systems.  
7 Smith noted: “The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it 
was made, the pointing of the hour…. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to 
produce it, they could not do it better. Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, 
but to the watch-maker, and we know that they are put into motion by a spring, which intends the 
effect it produces as little as they do…. we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their 
efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that 
to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God” (1982c, 87). 
8 Smith noted that man’s moral compass may be weak, so that humans come to depend 
upon a belief in the afterlife with an “all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be 
deceived and whose judgement can never be perverted.” Humans believe that in this “higher 
tribunal” to come “exact justice will be done” (1982c, 131-2). This is not quite the same thing as 
saying that Smith himself believed in an afterlife. 
9 Proponents of the “Adam Smith Problem” theorize that Moral Sentiments was the naïve 
work of the young professor whereas Wealth of Nations reflected Smith’s mature opinions. 
According to this view, Smith’s two books are contradictory. This thesis is untenable on several 
levels. Smith took Moral Sentiments through six editions, the last completed just a few months 
before he died. Moreover, Smith explicitly outlined a planned trilogy of books on morals, the 
economy, and justice (1982c, 342). He died before the last book could be completed. Most 
scholars accept Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations as complementary parts of a broader (if The Treatment of Smith’s Invisible Hand    25 
                                                                                                                                                                    
unfinished) scholarly plan. There are no theoretical conflicts, only much “ignorance and 
misunderstanding” (Raphael and MacFie 1982, 20). 
10 Viner noted that, “Adam Smith was not a doctrinaire advocate of laissez faire. He saw 
a wide and elastic range of activity for government, and he was prepared to extend it even farther 
if government, by improving its standards of competence, honesty, and public spirit, showed 
itself entitled to wider responsibilities” (1928, 153-54).  References 
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